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Recently the Diophantine Equation Hard Problem (DEHP) was proposed. It is 
utilized to design a standard identification scheme model. Since the computation 
involves only simple addition and multiplication steps, the efficiency and the time 
cost are greatly improved as compared to the existing identification schemes. In this 
paper, we propose a zero knowledge identification scheme based upon the DEHP. 
With the assumption such that DEHP is intractable, we provide the security analysis 
on the impersonation against non-adaptive passive attack (imp-pa) and show that our 
new proposed scheme is more desirable due to high efficiency in terms of time 
computation. 
 
Keywords: Diophantine Equation Hard Problem, standard identification scheme 
model, impersonation against non-adaptive passive attack. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
An identification scheme, involves two parties comprising of the 
Prover and the Verifier where the Prover is trying to identify himself to the 
Verifier in such a way that no important information (private message) is 
MALAYSIAN JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES 
 
Journal homepage: http://einspem.upm.edu.my/journal 
B. C. Tea, M. R. K. Ariffin & J. J. Chin 
 
88 Malaysian Journal of Mathematical Sciences 
 
relayed throughout the communication (zero knowledge). The typical 
identification scheme consists of three canonical moves, where the Prover 
sends the “commitment” to the Verifier; the Verifier will then send the 
“challenge” to the Prover; Prover “response” the challenge to the Verifier 
and finally Verifier accepts or rejects by verifying Prover’s response.  
 
The goal of the adversary in an identification scheme is to 
impersonate or to attack the scheme in such a way that it behaves as a 
cheating prover and succeeds in identifying itself to the honest verifier. 
With the existence of adversary that attempts to impersonate, three common 
attacks are usually considered, passive, active and concurrent attacks. 
Hence, security against these attacks becomes a major concern in 
cryptography, where analysis and establishment of the identification 
schemes are widely researched.  
 
 Existing identification schemes are based on specific number 
theoretic assumptions, such as RSA assumption in Guillou-Quisquater (GQ) 
identification; and also Discrete Log (DLOG) assumption in Schnorr 
identification schemes. These schemes provide security only under 
impersonation against passive attack, and were developed post Fiat-Shamir. 
The GQ scheme, which is one of the Fiat-Shamir’s variant, utilized the 
hardness of RSA problem, (i.e. solving e-th root problem). Schnorr’s 
scheme on the other hand, relies on the Discrete Log assumption, which is 
the hardness of solving the discrete log problem. Bellare and Palacio in 
their paper proposed the Reset Lemma together with the assumption of 
One-More-RSA Inversion Problem (Bellare (2003)) and One-More-
Discrete-Log Problem (OMDLP) (Koblitz (2008)) which successfully 
provides security under impersonation of active and concurrent attack of 
GQ and Schnorr’s schemes, respectively.   
  
 Other than the hardness problem of number theoretic assumptions, 
Stern (Stern (1996)) had proposed the identification scheme based on the 
worst-case hardness of the lattice problem, in which the author managed to 
provide the security against impersonation under passive attack. After a few 
years, with the improvement and modification made by Kawachi (2008), 
Stern’s identification scheme was proven to be provably secure against the 
concurrent attack - under the assumption of the worst-case hardness of the 
lattice problem.  
 
 There are also identification schemes which are established based 
on problems surrounding multivariate public key cryptography schemes 
such as in (Pointcheval (1995)) and (Pointcheval (2003)). The most recent 
identification scheme is by Sakumoto et al. in which they have proposed the 
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identification scheme based on multivariate quadratic polynomial 
(Sakumoto (2011)). It is also proven to be secure by the authors. The 
security of their scheme relies on the intractability of the multivariate 
quadratic polynomial under the assumption of the existence of non-
interactive commitment. This identification scheme with this assumption 
guarantees security under impersonation of active and passive attacks, even 
though the protocol is repeated in parallel. Sakumoto et al. also showed that 
their scheme is more efficient than other schemes utilizing the same 
multivariate function with different problems as stated in Sakumoto’s one 
(Sakumoto (2011)). 
 
 In this paper, we propose a new identification scheme based on the 
Diophantine Equation Hard Problem (Ariffin (2012)). We show that our 
identification scheme is secure against impersonation under non-adaptive 
passive attacks in the standard model. Our identification scheme based on 
DEHP is desirable since it increases the runtime efficiency comparing other 
schemes as it relies only on simple mathematical operations of addition and 
multiplication.  
 
The layout of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we will first 
review the definition of the DEHP and provide tighter parameter selection 
within the definition (in comparison to the original definition). We then 
describe the Bivariate Function Hard Problem (BFHP) which is a 2 
parameter situation for the DEHP (Ariffin (2013)). Proofs will be given on 
the uniqueness and intractability of the BFHP. We will also review in this 
section, identification schemes in the standard model, followed by the 
security model of the schemes. In Section 3 we propose the standard model 
of our identification scheme, followed by the security analysis in which 
proofs of security against impersonation under non-adaptive passive attack 
are given. In Section 4, we provide efficiency analysis and comparison of 




2.1 Diophantine Equations Hard Problem (DEHP) 
We revisited the definition by Ariffin (2012) and further enhance the 
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Definition 1 
Let   ∑ 	  be a summation where   are unknown integers which 
are 
-bits,   is a public sequence of integers and  ,   1 
where     which are -bits and at minimum 
    128. We define the 
DEHP is solved when  is prf-solved. That is, the preferred integer set  is 
found from the set of all possible integers  such that    ∑ 	 .  
Remark 1 
For the purpose of this research we will take   2. Hence, we can also 
address it as the Bivariate Function Hard Problem (BFHP). The following is 
a description of the BFHP with chosen parameter structures.  
 
Proposition 1 (Sakumoto et al. (2011)). 
Let 	,  , … ,   be a multivariate one-way function that maps : " #
"$%&,$'	( .Let 	and  be such functions (either identical or non-
identical) such that 	  	, , … ,  ,   )	, ), … , ) ,  and 
	,   1. Let *, + , 2-'	 , 2-  1 . Now, suppose we have the 
bivariate function .*, +  	* / +. If at minimum 
    1  129, 
it is infeasible to determine *, +  from .*, + . Furthermore, *, + is 
unique for .*, +  with high probability. 
 
Proof. 
We begin by proving that *, + is unique for each .*, +  with high 
probability. Assume there exists *	  * and +	  +  such that 
 
	*	 / +	  	* / +. 
 
 We will then have 
  +	  +  	
*	  * 
  
 
Since 	 ,   1and  1 2 , then the probability that  is an 
integer is 2' . 
 
Next we proceed to prove that to prf -solve the Diophantine equation given 
by .*, +  is infeasible. The general solution for .*, +  is given by 
 
*  *2 / 3 
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and 
+  +2  	3 
 
for some integer 3. To find * within the stipulated interval 2-'	, 2-  1  
we have to find the integer 3 such that 2-'	 4 * 4 2-  1.  
That is, 
2-'	  *2
 4 3 4
2-  1  *2
 . 
 
 Then the difference between the upper and the lower bound is 
approximate 2-''. Since
    1  129, then 
    2  128. 
Hence the difference is very large and finding the correct t is infeasible. 
This is also the same scenario for +.6 
 
Definition 2 (Ariffin (2013)) 
We say that the BFHP is hard to be prf-solved if for all probabilistic 
polynomial time algorithm there exist a negligible function 7  such that 
89:;<8=>?@A  1B C 7 . 
 
2.2 Identification Scheme in Standard Model 
An identification scheme in a standard model consists of three probabilistic 
polynomial time algorithmsDE).E, 89F+E, GE9H) which are defined as 
follows: 
 
1. KeyGen: The Simulator I on input of security parameter1, generates 
and publishes the master public key,  
JK and keeps the master secret 
key,  
LK to itself.  
 
2. Prove: An algorithm that outputs the Commitment as the initial step of 
identification and responses to the corresponding Challenge from the 
Verifier. 
3. Verify: A deterministic verification algorithm that first outputs 
challenge to the Prover and takes an input as the purported response and 
the public key. It outputs either 0 or 1. 
2.3 Security Model of Identification Scheme 
The security of the identification schemes remains on the probability of the 
impersonation by the adversary. In other words, after certain interactions of 
the adversary with the honest verifier, the adversary succeeds in the 
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impersonation attempt and is accepted by the verifier with non-negligible 
probability.  
 
In analyzing the security of the identification schemes, we consider three 
types of the adversaries: 
 
1. Passive Attacker: The passive adversary eavesdrops on conversations 
between an honest prover and verifier to acquire information (usually 
conversation transcript). 
 
2. Active Attacker: The active adversary interacts with honest prover 
sequentially as a cheating verifier to acquire information before 
attempting impersonation.  
 
3. Concurrent Attacker: A special type of active adversary where it can 
interact with multiple provers at the same time to acquire information 
before attempting impersonation. 
 The whole process of identification schemes are based on the two-
phase game, in which the impersonation attack is between an impersonator 
and the challenger: 
 
1. Setup. The challenger takes in the security parameter and runs KeyGen. 
The resulting system parameters are given to the impersonator while the 
master secret is kept to itself. 
 
2. Phase 1. In this phase, the impersonator plays the role as a cheating 
verifier and can issue transcript queries to the challenger. The 
challenger responds by sending the commitment, challenge and 
corresponding response to the impersonator. These queries are 
interleaved and asked adaptively.  
 
3. Phase 2. In this phase, the impersonator now acts as a cheating prover 
and output a challenge which it wishes to impersonate and tries to 
convince the verifier to accept. Impersonator is said to win the game if 
it successfully convinces the verifier in accepting it.   
 We say that an identification scheme is 3, MN , 7 -secure under non-
adaptive passive attacks for any non-adaptive passive impersonator O who 
runs in time 3, 89:O 
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3.  THE STANDARD MODEL OF IDENTIFICATION SCHEME  
BASED ON DEHP / BFHP 
 We begin by discussing the following lemma regarding the initial 
solution pair for the Diophantine equation     .*, +  	* / + which 
are *2 , +2 . 
 
Lemma 2. 





From .*, +  	* / +, by the parameter selection as mentioned in 
Proposition 1, it is obvious that .*, +  is at minimum 
-bits. To obtain 
the initial solution, begin by using the Euclidean algorithm upon the 
Diophantine equation 	* / +  gcd	,   1. Then, to obtain the 
initial solution for .*, +  	* / + multiply the initial solution 




3.1 Standard Identification Scheme against Impersonation under 
Non-Adaptive Passive Attack 
KeyGen: The algorithm generates the private keys TU	 , "V$%&,V$'	, 
the public keys of T+U	 , "$%&,$'	 and compute   W  ∑ +	 .  
Publicize T+U	 , W and keep TU	  secret. We will use at minimum 
  128. 
 
Identification Protocol:  
1. Prover 8 picks  T9U	 , "V$%&,V$'	 randomly and sends  X 
∑ +9	  to the Verifier  G. 
 
2. Verifier G picks a random challenge,  , T0,1U and sends to Prover 8. 
3. Prover8 returns the response by computing Z  9 / for   1,2 to 
Verifier G. 
4. Verifier G checks the bit length of all responses TZU	  and accepts if 
all responses are within the interval 2'	, 2(	 and ∑ +Z	  X /W. 
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Completeness  
The following shows the completeness of the identification process: 
  
  
∑ +Z	  +	Z	 / +Z 
    +	9	 / 	 / +9 /   
    +	9	 / +		  / +9 / + 
    +	9	 / +9 / +		 / + 
    X / W. 6 
Remark 2 
Since initial solution *2, +2  for the Diophantine equation W  ∑ +	  is 
at least 3-bits, then to utilize it for impersonation would be futile even 
though the summation  ∑ +Z	  X / W would still be obtained. In fact, 
any element within the general solution for W  ∑ +	  (i.e. 	  	,2 /
+3 and   ,2  +	3 where 3 , ") would result in the summation 
∑ +Z	  X / W to be true. However, for each incorrect 3 , " would 
result in responses of TZU	 \ 2'	, 2(	 .  In fact, by Proposition 1 
we have proven that the preferred solution 	,   is unique with high 
probability for W  ∑ +	  and the corresponding 3 is infeasible to be 
obtained. 
 
3.2 Security Analysis of Identification Scheme against Impersonation 
under Non-Adaptive Passive Attack 
Theorem 1. 
The identification scheme based on the BFHP is 3, MN , 7 -secure against 
impersonation under non-adaptive passive attacks assuming the BFHP 
is3′, 7′-hard where 
7 C ]7′ / 1M 
Proof. 
To provide a proof of security of the identification scheme, we assume if 
there exists an Impersonator, O who can 3, MN , 7 -break the identification 
scheme then there exists an algorithm (Simulator), Iwho can 3′, MN , 7′-
solve the BFHP. The following shows the simulation of the challenger from 
Simulator, I to the Impersonator, O: 
 
1. SETUP.  The Simulator, I randomly chooses public keys T+U	  
and   W  ∑ +	 . It should be noticed that the Simulator, I does not 
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know the secretsTU	 . I then passes all the public keys T+U	 , W 
to the Impersonator, O. 
 
2. TRANSCRIPT QUERIES. For any transcript queried by 
Impersonator  O, the simulatorI randomly selectsTZU	 ,"V$%&,V$^&,  , T0,1Uand returns the valid transcript to  O. 
 
_X  ` +Z

	
 W, , TZU	 a 
 
The correctness of the valid transcript is given below: 
 
I randomly selects ̃, TZ̃U	  and computes 
 
  Xc  ∑ + Z̃	  ̃W 
   +	9	 / ̃	 / +9 / ̃  ̃W 
   +	9	 / +	̃	 / +9 / +̃  ̃W 
   +	9	 / +9 / +	̃	 / +̃  ̃W 
   X / ̃W  ̃W6 
 
3. IMPERSONATION PHASE. After some time  3, the Impersonator  O 
wishes to challenge and impersonate. It is assumed that the 
Impersonator O plays the role of cheating prover that tries to convince 
the simulator, I to accept. By resetting O to the commitment phase after 
sending the response dZ	,e	
 , dZ,e	

,  I will then able to obtain two 
valid transcript  
fX, 	, dZ	,e	
 gandfX,  , dZ,e	
 g. 
 
Here Z	, and Z, represent the responses sent by the Prover upon 
challenge 	 and  respectively. Upon receiving the valid transcripts, I 
will then verify the bit length of dZ	,e, dZ,e , "V$%&,V$^&.  
 
Extraction is then done by calculating  
 
_	  Z	,  Z	,	  	 ,  
Z,  Z,	
  	 a 
 
which outputs the solution to the BFHP problem of W  ∑ +	 . This 
completes the simulation. 
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Remark 3 
It can be easily seen that 
  	  h&,V'h&,&iV'i&  
   j&(iVk& 'j&(i&k& iV'i&  
   iVk&'i&k&iV'i&  6 
Remark 4 
Upon the responses purported by Impersonator O, Z  9 /  with 9 , "V$%&,V$ and  , "V$%&,V$, the computed responses are within 
the interval2'	, 2(	 . Once the simulator I accepts the correctness of 
the responses. it will then continue the extracting process. 
 
4. PROBABILITY STUDY. The analysis of the probability is based on 
the Simulator, I winning the game and solves the BFHP. Let 7 
+l-m'mn  be the success probability of the impersonation under 
passive attack and let 7′  +opqr be the probability of Simulator 
I winning the game by solving the BFHP, by the Reset Lemma 
proposed by Bellare and Palacio: 
 
89:I LFs+EL ;<8B  89tI F
J*3EL TU	 u 
7′ v w7  1Mx

 
7 C 1M / ]7′ 
+l-m'mn C
1
M / ]+opqr  . 6 
 
4. COMPARISON 
The original Fiat-Shamir identification scheme utilized the square 
root modulo problem in designing the scheme. Besides that, current existing 
identification schemes, such as Guillou-Quisquater (GQ) and Schnorr’s 
identification schemes utilized the RSA problem and Discrete Log Problem 
(DLP), respectively. Our identification scheme which is based upon the 
BFHP uses simple addition and multiplication operations, containing no 
pairings, hence provides efficient computing time. The following table 
indicates the complexity of the identification scheme of our work based on 
BFHP as compared to Fiat-Shamir, GQ and Schnorr’s schemes: 
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TABLE 1: Complexity comparison of identification schemes based on 4 different hard 
problem assumptions. 
 
 BFHP Fiat-Shamir 
Addition  Multiplication Exponentiation Addition  Multiplication Exponentiation 
KeyGen k k 0 0 0 k 
Prove 3k 3k+1 0 0 k 2k 
Verify k k+2 0 0 k 2k 
 
 Guillou-Quisquater Schnorr 
Addition  Multiplication Exponentiation Addition  Multiplication Exponentiation 
KeyGen 0 0 k 0 0 k 
Prove 0 k 2k k k 0 




Based on the time complexity analyzed in the previous section, our 
zero knowledge identification scheme based on the BFHP provides better 
efficiency. As proposed in Section 3, this scheme utilizes a Diophantine 
Equation which consists of only addition and multiplication operations, 
with no exponentiation and pairing. This will greatly increase the speed 
during the identification process. We have also showed that our scheme 
based is provably secure against the non-adaptive passive attack, under the 
assumption that solving the BFHP is hard. Hence, our proposed 
identification scheme is more desirable than existing schemes. The 
identification scheme of security against impersonation under active and 
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